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CHEROKEE

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 7/3/00 (GLEYSTEN, W.H.) OR-M
TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, PINT, KS, US
SUBJECT: KOREA FOCUS: JULY 3 DISCUSSION WITH FONMIN

REF: (A) SEOUL 8508, (B) SEOUL 8506, (C) STATE 175091

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. FOREIGN MINISTER TONG-JIN PARK (M-R: PAK TONG-CHIN)
ASKED TO SEE ME PRIVATELY JULY 3 ABOUT MY
DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SECRETARY. I USED ROUGHLY THE SAME
LINE AS I HAD WITH THE DEFENSE MINISTER AND ACTING PRIME
MINISTER (REFTEL A). SINCE HE IS VERY SYMPATHETIC,
I REVIEWED WITH HIM MY CONCERN OVER MANIPULA-
TION OF ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT, GIVING HIM IN THE PROCESS
A FAIRLY DETAILED ACCOUNT OF MY CONVERSATIONS WITH KWANG
SOO CHOI (M-R: CH'OE KWANG-SU) AND CHUN DOO-HWAN (M-R: CHON
TU-HWAN) ON THIS MATTER. I ALSO COMPLAINED ABOUT THE
CENSORSHIP OF THE SECRETARY'S MOST RECENT REMARKS ON KOREA.
I POINTED OUT THAT HIS COMMENTS HAD BEEN EXTREMELY
BALANCED AND CENSORSHIP OF THEM WAS IRONIC INASMUCH AS HE
HAD ASKED ME TO EXPRESS HIS GREAT UNHAPPINESS ABOUT OUR
INABILITY TO MAKE OUR POSITION CLEAR TO THE KOREAN PUBLIC.

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3. APOLOGETICALLY, PARK TRIED TO EXPLAIN WHY MOFA
HAD REFUSED TO TRANSMIT THE CONGRESSIONAL LETTER (REF B)
TO PRESIDENT CHOI. HIS TECHNICAL EXPLANATION WAS THAT IT
MIGHT HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO TRANSMIT IT IF IT HAD

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES E LAHIGUERA
DATE/CASE ID: 17 JAN 2012 201101232

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NOT AN OFFICIAL COVER LETTER FROM THE EMBASSY, BUT IN ESSENCE HE SAID THAT THE MINISTRY WAS SCARED TO TRANSMIT A LETTER WHICH WOULD GIVE OFFENSE TO "RATHER NATIONALISTIC GENERALS." I COMMENTED THAT THE U.S. CONGRESS WAS A CO-EQUAL BRANCH OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND HAD EVERY RIGHT TO REQUEST THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO TRANSMIT COMMUNICATIONS TO FOREIGN LEADERS. WE FREQUENTLY DID SO TO THE ROKG WITHOUT ANY TROUBLE. FOR MOFA TO REFUSE A LETTER JUST BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T LIKE THE CONTENT STRUCK ME AS VERY FOOLISH. I THEN ASKED WHAT THEY WOULD DO IF A FRIEND SUCH AS SAM NUNN WERE TO ASK THE DEPARTMENT TO TRANSMIT A SOMEWHAT SIMILAR LETTER. PARK THOUGHT FOR AWHILE AND THEN SAID OBVIOUSLY THEY SHOULD TRANSMIT IT. WE AGREED THAT THE LETTER HAS IN EFFECT BEEN RECEIVED AND THE CASE SHOULD BE CLOSED.

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I SAID IF THERE WERE FUTURE LETTERS I WOULD CONSULT IN ADVANCE ABOUT THE BEST METHOD OF TRANSMISSION BUT IF THERE WERE ANY MORE REFUSALS, THERE WOULD BE HELL TO PAY.

4. I MENTIONED RATHER CASUALLY THAT I FEARED TONGSUN PARK MIGHT TRY TO GET INTO THE ACT BY INGRATIATING HIMSELF WITH THE GENERALS. I SAID TO PARK THAT I THOUGHT NO ONE WAS BETTER EQUIPPED THAN HE TO EXPLAIN TO CHUN DOO HWAN THE DANGERS OF GETTING EVEN NEAR TONGSUN PARK OR EMPLOYING THE TECHNIQUES OF BRIBERY AND LOBBYING USED DURING THE EARLY 70'S. THE FONMIN SAID HE WAS SURE THAT TONGSUN PARK WOULD BE KEPT AT ARM'S LENGTH, AND HE AGREED IT WOULD BE DISASTROUS TO TRY ANOTHER SEVENTIES-STYLE LOBBYING CAMPAIGN IN THE U.S. HE SAID HE WOULD MAKE THESE POINTS WITH THE

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GENERALS.

5. I GAVE PARK THE LATEST PLAY ON THE SOLARZ VISIT, EXPLAINING OUR POSITION, THE CONGRESS'S POSITION, AND THE FACT THAT SOLARZ WOULD BE TRAVELING PRIVATELY. WHILE WE WERE MOST UNENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT THE VISIT AND THOUGHT THAT THE MOOD IN BOTH PYONGYANG AND SEOUL WAS NOT PROPITIOUS, WE NEVERTHELESS HOPED THAT THE ROKG WOULD TREAT SOLARZ IN A SERIOUS AND FRIENDLY WAY. PARK SUGGESTED THAT SOLARZ WAS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN RE-ELECTION PUBLICITY BUT AGREED HE SHOULD BE TREATED PROPERLY WHILE IN SEOUL. HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE ONLY TIME FOR OFFICIAL DISCUSSION WOULD BE THE BRIEF TIME BEFORE SOLARZ' DEPARTURE ON MONDAY, THE 14TH. GLEYSTEN

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