

Classification: ~~SECRET (EXDIS)~~
Message #: 1980SEOUL01114 (Film #: D800048-0379)
Systematic Review Decision: RELEASED, APPROVED

~~SECRET~~

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 ACTION SS-30

RELEASE AUTHORITY: CAHILLA, SENIOR REVIEWER U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE RELEASE DECISION: RELEASE IN FULL DATE: April 12, 2006
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E.O. 12065:RDS-1 1/28/00 (GLEYSTEN, W.H.)OR-M
 TAGS: PEPR, PINT, US, KS
 SUBJECT: ADMIRAL LONG'S CALL ON PRESIDENT CHOI

1. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.
2. IN ADDITION TO HIS CALL ON DEFMIN CHOO (SEPTTEL) ADMIRAL LONG HAD A VERY PRODUCTIVE ONE-HOUR CONVERSATION WITH PRESIDENT CHOI AND A SIMILAR SHORTER CONVERSATION WITH PRIMIN SHIN JANUARY 24. GENERAL WICKHAM AND I ACCOMPANIED. THE ADMIRAL REVIEWED BRIEFLY WHY THE U.S. HAD BEEN SO DISTURBED BY THE EVENTS OF DECEMBER 12 WHICH VIOLATED THE CHAIN OF COMMAND AND THREATENED THE UNITY OF THE ROK ARMED FORCES. MOREOVER, AFTER LISTENING TO THE PRESIDENT'S BROMIDAL ASSURANCES THAT ALL WAS NOW IN ORDER FOLLOWING THE "REGRETTABLE INCIDENT", ADMIRAL LONG COMMENTED THAT HE WOULD BE DOING KOREANS A DISSERVICE IF HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT OUR CONCERNS WERE SO EASILY PACIFIED. AT THE SAME TIME HE WENT OUT OF HIS WAY TO INDICATE OUR DESIRE TO COOPERATE TO EASE KOREA'S PROBLEMS AND TO ENHANCE ITS DEFENSE POSTURE.
3. MUCH OF THE CONVERSATION DEALT WITH THE IMPLICATIONS OF MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS. PRESIDENT CHOI WORRIED THAT

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REDEPLOYMENT OF 7TH FLEET CARRIER TASK GROUPS FROM THE JAPAN/KOREA AREA TO THE MIDDLE EAST MIGHT BE PERCEIVED BY THE NORTH KOREANS AS WEAKENESS AND LEAD TO MILITARY ACTIONS AGAINST THE SOUTH. ADMIRAL LONG AGREED THAT WE NEEDED TO REMAIN VIGILANT ABOUT THE VERY REAL NORTH KOREAN MILITARY THREAT. HE EXPLAINED, HOWEVER, THAT WE HAD RESOURCES, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT, WHICH COULD BE DEPLOYED IN ADDITION TO CARRIER TASK FORCES. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE WERE NOT YET IDEALLY EQUIPPED TO DEAL WITH REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN THE CINCPAC AREA, BUT HE POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD TAKEN SHIPS FROM THE ATLANTIC FLEET AS WELL AS THE 7TH FLEET TO REINFORCE OUR MIDDLE EAST FORCES. WE HAD TO DEPLOY OUR ASSETS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MOST APPROPRIATE PRIORITIES. AT THE PRESENT TIME THESE DICTATED A CONCENTRATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST AREA FOR THE PROTECTION OF U.S. VITAL INTERESTS. BUT OUR MIDDLE EAST ACTIONS WERE ALSO PROTECTING THE VITAL INTERESTS OF THE ROK AND JAPAN.

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4. THE OTHER SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION OR RATHER MONOLOGUE BY THE PRESIDENT WAS THE NORTH/SOUTH KOREAN DIALOGUE AND THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS. THE PRESIDENT DESCRIBED THE BACKGROUND OF THE ROKG'S RATHER POSITIVE RESPONSE TO THE DPRK LETTER, DISPLAYING MUCH WARINESS ABOUT EVIL NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS AND GREAT SKEPTICISM THAT ANYTHING GOOD WOULD COME OF THE AFFAIR. GLEYSTEN

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