

UNCLASSIFIED

E1686

TEXT OF TELEGRAM BOSEOUL 006663

EXCISE

DEPARTMENT OF STATE 9003068 IS/FPC/CDR TRB Date: 9/13/93 1121

ADP180

PAGE 01 SEDUL 06663 261030Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W

O 261020Z MAY 80
FM ANEMBASSY SEOUL
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6568

SEOUL 06663

EXDIS

E.G. 12065: RDS-1 5/26/00 (GLEYSTEN, W.H.) OR-M
TAGS: PGOV, MILI, PINT, PINS, KS, US
SUBJECT: MAY 26 MEETING WITH BLUE HOUSE SYG CHOI

2. NOTE. SUBSEQUENT TO THE CONVERSATION RECORDED BELOW,
WE RECEIVED RELIABLE INDICATIONS THAT A MILITARY OPERA-
TION TO RE-OCCUPY KWANGJU MAY BEGIN AROUND MIDNIGHT
TONIGHT.

3. FOLLOWING UP A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION LAST NIGHT, I
MET BRIEFLY WITH BLUE HOUSE SYG KWANG SOO CHOI (M-R;
CHOI KWANG-SU) THIS MORNING, MAY 26. AFTER DESCRIBING
THE DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION IN KWANGJU AND EFFORTS
TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS PEACEFULLY, CHOI SAID THAT THE

<input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE	<input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	MR Cases Only:
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCISE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY	EO Citations _____
<input type="checkbox"/> DENY	IN PART	
<input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info		TS authority to _____
FOIA Exemptions 67		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CLASSIFY as <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> C OADR
PA Exemptions _____		<input type="checkbox"/> DOWNGRADE TS to <input type="checkbox"/> S or <input type="checkbox"/> C OADR

Cat. A - [unclear] removed;
hand sent to O-FAIRC

Cat. B - [unclear] sent to O-FAIRC
with additional access
controlled by S/S

Cat. C - Caption and custody
maintained by S/S

Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly Jr.

Date: 4-28-93 19__

B-1
9
5/5

B1A3

B1A5

4. I TOLD CHOI THAT WE HAD PASSED MESSAGES TO THE MILI-
TARY AUTHORITIES VIA GENERAL WICKHAM /
URGING THAT ANY MILITARY ACTION TAKEN IN KWANGJU BE DONE
IN WAYS TO MINIMIZE THE LOSS OF LIFE AND HOLD DOWN THE
NUMBER OF PEOPLE POLITICALLY ALIENATED BY REPRESSIVE

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ACTION. WE WERE NOT TELLING THE GOVERNMENT TO REFRAIN FROM MILITARY ACTION SINCE WE RECOGNIZED THE DANGERS OF AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF LAWLESSNESS IN KWANGJU; WE WERE, HOWEVER, URGING THAT ALL REALISTIC NON-MILITARY OPTIONS BE EXHAUSTED AND THAT ANY MILITARY OPERATIONS BE CARRIED OUT WITH THE GREATEST CARE. I ADDED QUITE FRANKLY THAT I WAS EXTREMELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PAST BEHAVIOR OF THE SPECIAL FORCES AND HOPED THEY WOULD NOT BE INCLUDED IN ANY RECAPTURE OPERATION (THE PROBABILITY IS THAT THEY WILL BE EMPLOYED).

5. I EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD BEEN VERY BOTHERED BY BROADCASTS IN THE KWANGJU AREA ASSERTING THAT GENERAL WICKHAM HAD NOT ONLY AUTHORIZED THE SHIFT OF TROOPS TO KWANGJU BUT HAD ALSO ENCOURAGED THE MOVEMENT OF MILITARY FORCES TO CONTROL THE CITY. WE HAD TOLD THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES THAT SUCH CRUDE EFFORTS TO SHIFT THE BLAME TO US WERE UNACCEPTABLE AND IF CONTINUED, WOULD NECESSITATE A FIRM U.S. DENIAL. THE MILITARY SEEMED TO APPRECIATE THE PROBLEM, BUT WE WERE STILL NOT SURE WHETHER CORRECTIVE ACTION HAD BEEN TAKEN. I NOTED THAT SECRETARY MUSKIE WAS PERSONALLY CONCERNED AND I EMPHASIZED THAT NOTHING COULD BE WORSE THAN TO HAVE A SIZEABLE ANTI-AMERICAN MOVEMENT ON TOP OF ALL THE OTHER PROBLEMS IN CHOLLA PROVINCE.

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CHOI SAID [

6. IN CONCLUSION, I REMINDED CHOI THAT THE ULTIMATE CAUSE, IN MY OPINION, OF THE PROBLEMS IN KWANGJU WAS POLITICAL ACTION TAKEN IN SEOUL. UNLESS THERE COULD BE SOME POSITIVE POLITICAL SIGNAL GIVEN TO PEOPLE, KOREA'S SITUATION COULD DETERIORATE STILL FURTHER WITH MOST ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES FOR ALL OF US. I SAID SOME OF THE MILITARY OFFICERS SEEMED TO APPRECIATE THIS POINT BUT SEVERAL CRUCIAL INDIVIDUALS DID NOT. THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE BROUGHT AROUND TO UNDERSTAND. [

GLEYSTEN

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B 1A 5

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